The predictable response to the US operation in Venezuela has been a torrent of moralising about “sovereignty” and the “rules-based order”, paired with studied silence on the central point: Venezuela has been governed by an authoritarian system that hollowed out democratic legitimacy and ruled through coercion.

On 3 January 2026, US forces carried out strikes in Venezuela and captured Nicolás Maduro and his wife, removing them to the United States.  President Trump then stated the US would temporarily administer Venezuela during a transition and restart oil production.  The operation is legally contested and has triggered a predictable round of condemnation from parts of the international community. 

That legal debate matters. It is not the whole debate. The legitimacy question comes first.

Legitimacy is not a slogan

Sovereignty is not a magic cloak that transforms electoral manipulation into lawful authority. A regime that blocks genuine competition, captures institutions, and represses opponents does not deserve to be treated as a normal democratic government with an unquestioned mandate.

The Carter Center was explicit after Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election: it did not meet international standards of electoral integrity, could not be considered democratic, and the Center could not verify the results announced by the electoral authority. 

The European Parliament went further, recognising Edmundo González Urrutia as Venezuela’s legitimate and democratically elected president and identifying María Corina Machado as leader of the democratic forces. 

So when critics ask “who should have become president?”, the answer is constitutional, not sentimental: the democratic mandate should have prevailed, with González Urrutia taking office and a transition led by Venezuela’s democratic movement delivering credible elections and restored institutions. 

International law is not a substitute for strategic seriousness

Legal experts have questioned the US operation’s coherence under international law and pointed to the lack of congressional authorisation.  That critique should be heard.

It still does not follow that inaction was the moral high ground.

International law without enforcement is performance. Dictators understand this better than Western editorial boards do. They weaponise paralysis and hide behind process while entrenching a coercive state. The “rules-based order” becomes a slogan used to oppose action by democracies, not a discipline imposed on autocrats.

A conservative foreign policy position does not romanticise force. It refuses to pretend that law, on its own, dislodges regimes that have already demonstrated contempt for democratic accountability.

Precedent: the US has removed dictators and reversed coups before

Maduro’s removal is not an unprecedented break with history. The United States has repeatedly used force—sometimes controversially, sometimes with explicit multilateral authorisation—to remove dictators, dismantle criminalised regimes, or reverse coups that displaced elected governments. The pattern is clear: legitimacy matters, and security vacuums in strategically sensitive regions rarely resolve themselves. This list is not exhaustive list of interventions:

• Panama (1989–90): Operation Just Cause removed de facto ruler Manuel Noriega and brought him to the US to face criminal charges; the elected president Guillermo Endara was sworn in. 
• Haiti (1994): Operation Uphold Democracy removed the military regime that overthrew elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, under UN Security Council Resolution 940, and restored the elected government. 
• Grenada (1983): Operation Urgent Fury followed an internal coup and the killing of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, with the US and regional partners toppling the military council. 
• Libya (2011): Intervention proceeded under UNSCR 1973 to protect civilians; it became, in practice, regime-ending and remains a cautionary example of what happens when removal is not matched by stabilisation planning and institutional rebuild. 

These cases are not identical. That is the point. The responsible debate is never “intervention good” versus “intervention bad”. It is whether decisive action produces rapid constitutional restoration, or an unmanaged vacuum.

Before someone says I’ve missed Yugoslavia, it’s actually a different category, and worth stating accurately. Yugoslavia is often thrown into the “regime change” bucket. It does not belong there in the same way.

NATO’s 1999 Kosovo air campaign (Operation Allied Force) was framed as coercive action to halt a humanitarian catastrophe and compel withdrawal, not as a declared mission to depose Belgrade’s leadership.  The post-conflict framework then moved into the UN system through UNSCR 1244 and an international security presence. 

In practice, the intervention and pressure weakened Slobodan Milošević’s position, but his fall came through domestic politics—defeat and mass protest culminating in October 2000. 

Yugoslavia demonstrates a distinct model: coercive intervention to stop atrocities and enforce withdrawal, followed by internal regime change driven by a population reclaiming its politics. It is a reminder that external action can create conditions for democratic transition, but cannot substitute for it.

Strategic interest is not a guilty secret

Trump’s critics treat the oil dimension as proof of malign intent. Trump made it explicit that energy and administration are part of the plan. 

Here is the reality that has been forgotten in Europe, serious governments pursue strategic interests. Energy security is national security. A criminalised petro-state in the Western Hemisphere is not an abstract moral seminar; it is a live strategic vulnerability. The proper test is outcome: does this action end dictatorship and restore lawful government—or does it drift into occupation theatre and patronage?

The non-negotiable: removal must mean restoration

Support for Maduro’s removal is not support for permanent control. The benchmark is clear and measurable:

• immediate stabilisation and protection of civilians
• a published transitional roadmap with timelines
• restoration of political freedoms (media space, parties, prisoner releases)
• credible elections with transparent, auditable results
• oil revenue governance that prevents a new slush fund replacing the old one

Opposition figures themselves have stressed the need for an orderly transition and the rejection of a simple regime reshuffle in Caracas. 

Europe’s hypocrisy is the real scandal

Europe’s reaction has been familiar: distance, caution, procedural language, and lectures.  This is the same Europe that expects American power to underwrite the Atlantic alliance, expects America to carry critical enablers, and then adopts a posture of moral superiority when America acts.

The hypocrisy is sharpened by Ukraine. Europe has spent years rediscovering, far too slowly, that deterrence is not achieved by statements. It requires industrial capacity, ammunition production, readiness, and resolve. A continent that struggles to meet its own defence responsibilities has limited credibility when it claims the mantle of global principle.

Conclusion

The left’s argument reduces to a reflex: America acts, therefore America is wrong. Maduro’s illegitimacy is treated as secondary to outrage about US power. That hierarchy is backwards.

Maduro’s regime lacked democratic legitimacy on credible grounds.  The democratic alternative has been clearly identified.  The legality of the operation is contested and should be debated.  But the moral and strategic case for ending dictatorship is strong—provided the next phase is disciplined: constitutional restoration, not limbo.

Europe should stop posturing and start behaving like a serious strategic actor. Until it does, it will remain excellent at commentary and poor at outcomes.

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Next up: Iran – how should the West help Iranians to overthrow the Mullahs?