There is no serious student of history who does not recognise the debt Europe owes the United States. Twice in the last century, American blood and treasure were expended to pull this continent back from catastrophe. From Normandy to the Cold War, and through the campaigns against jihadist terrorism that followed, the United States has been the indispensable anchor of Western security. Gratitude is not weakness; it is an honest reading of history, and it is precisely why what we are now witnessing is so concerning.
The issue is not American power, which remains formidable. The issue is how that power is exercised and whether it strengthens the West as a whole. The American presidency is not merely a national office but a strategic institution that demands steadiness, restraint and seriousness. When that gives way to something more impulsive and more publicly combative, particularly toward allies, it diminishes rather than strengthens authority.
Quiet disagreements between allies should be handled in private. Publicly, the West should stand together. When that discipline breaks down, and allies are rebuked while adversaries are treated with conspicuous respect, a damaging signal is sent that the alliance is less coherent than it ought to be. In geopolitics, perception hardens quickly into reality.
Nowhere is that clearer than in the handling of Iran. The Islamic Republic is a theocracy, not a conventional state. Clerical authority sits at the apex of power, reinforced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is a system designed to endure.
Iran is not a fragile or backward state waiting to collapse. It is one of the world’s oldest civilisations, educated, culturally rich and deeply resilient. Its people have endured empire, revolution, war and sanctions. They do not break easily, which is precisely why simplistic assumptions about regime collapse are so dangerous.
Removing senior figures in such a system does not produce collapse but replacement. Harder men, fewer restraints and deeper resolve. Disarming a rogue state is a legitimate aim, but strategy does not end with the first strike; it begins there. In this case, there was no credible end state, no sustained alignment and no plan for what followed.
The regime has not fallen. The anticipated uprising has not come. Instead, the system has entrenched itself. This is not because the Iranian people are content. Many live under fear and repression, where the cost of dissent is immediate and severe. However deep the frustration, most are not in a position to take the leap required to bring the system down themselves.
The real failure, however, is what followed. Action was taken without securing allied alignment, and when that alignment did not materialise, frustration was directed outward. That is not strategy. It is miscalculation.
That miscalculation has exposed something equally troubling, which is the weakness of the alliance itself. Italy has refused the use of bases for offensive operations. Spain has restricted access. Britain has offered only limited and hesitant support after initial reluctance. Others have retreated behind legal argument and political positioning.
This is not strategic clarity but disunity. When allies are neither aligned before action nor united after it, trust erodes. When trust erodes, alliances weaken quietly but decisively. Adversaries will take note, and China in particular will observe a divided West with interest.
It is at this point that the historical parallel becomes uncomfortable. The lesson of the Suez Crisis was not simply military overreach, but diplomatic failure. Britain and France acted without full alignment, assumed support would follow, and instead found themselves isolated and forced into retreat under pressure from their own allies.
The parallel is not exact, but the warning is clear. Power exercised without alignment, legitimacy and preparation risks achieving the opposite of what it intends.
If this exposes American misjudgement, it equally exposes European weakness. For too long, Britain and much of Europe have taken the United States for granted. Defence has been underfunded, capability hollowed out and strategic seriousness diluted.
The warning signs were visible under Tony Blair, worsened under David Cameron and remain unresolved under Keir Starmer. The cumulative effect is stark. Britain speaks the language of global influence while struggling to generate credible force, with limited escorts, constrained manpower and an ageing deterrent resting on assumptions that deserve far greater scrutiny.
Recent decisions reinforce the sense of retreat. The surrender of Diego Garcia signals contraction at the very moment global reach matters most. Our inability to consistently protect British interests in the Middle East raises serious questions about both capability and will.
This is not realism. It is drift. The same incoherence is visible in energy policy. A serious state balances transition with resilience. It does not ignore available domestic resources in the North Sea while facing immediate pressure. Energy security is not ideological but foundational.
Beneath all of this lies a failure of priorities. A nation that places welfare ahead of defence in an increasingly dangerous world is not compassionate but negligent. Defence is the first duty of government and without it everything else is contingent.
The truth is therefore plain. America risks weakening its leadership when power is exercised without discipline or alignment. Europe weakens the alliance when it fails to carry its share of the burden.
This is not a story of American arrogance or European innocence but one of imbalance, where one side overreaches because the other has underperformed.
The answer is not anti-Americanism but restored partnership. America must lead with discipline. Europe must step up seriously rather than rhetorically.
We are allies, not vassal states. But nor are we credible partners if we cannot defend ourselves or sustain our own economies. Power without partnership breeds resentment, while partnership without power breeds irrelevance.
Respect is not owed, it is earned. If the West is to retain it, it must relearn that fact quickly .


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